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Tuition reimbursement programs provide financial assistance for direct costs of education and are
a type of general skills training program commonly offered by employers in the United States. Standard
human capital theory argues that investment in firm-specific skills reduces turnover, while investment
in general skills training could result in increased turnover. However, firms cite increased retention
as a motivation for offering tuition reimbursement programs. This rationale for offering these programs
challenges the predictions of the standard human capital model. This paper tests empirically whether
participation in tuition reimbursement programs increases employee retention using data from a non-profit
institution. To document the prevalence of tuition reimbursement programs, the case study analysis
is supplemented with findings from the Survey of Employer-Provided Training, 1995 (SEPT95). This
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1.0  Introduction 
 
Becker’s (1964) seminal work on investment in human capital makes a fundamental 
distinction between general and firm-specific skills, which has implications for investment and 
employee turnover. Firm-specific human capital is defined as having value only to the current 
employment relationship, while general human capital is valuable to both current and potential 
employers. Becker’s theory predicts that employees will bear the full cost of general skills 
training – either by paying for training directly or by accepting lower wages during training 
periods – because employers face the threat of not capturing the return on their investment due to 
“poaching” of trained employees by other employers. In a competitive labor market, workers 
have the incentive to invest efficiently in general human capital because they receive a wage 
equal to the value of their marginal product.  In the case of investment in firm-specific human 
capital, employers and employees share the costs. Neither party is willing to bear the full amount 
due to the risk of opportunistic behavior by the other.  The employer and the employee share the 
surplus, or rents, from the investment; the relative bargaining power of the two parties 
determines how these rents are allocated.  
This standard theory on investment in human capital has implications for turnover. 
Investment in firm-specific human capital reduces turnover because rents accrue only if the 
employment relationship is maintained. However, this result does not hold for investments in 
general human capital because these skills are transferable across employers. According to 
Becker’s theory, offering employees general skills training would increase turnover. 
Despite the predictions of this theory, recent empirical studies show that firms provide 
general training to their workers and argue that firms bear part of the cost.
2 Tuition 
reimbursement programs are an example of general skills training provided by firms.  Employers 
reimburse employees for direct costs of coursework taken at accredited academic institutions. 
Because instruction and degree accreditation occur at third-party institutions, skills acquired are 
transferable – as well as observable – to many potential employers. Hence, tuition 
reimbursement programs closely resemble general skills training as described by Becker.  
                                                 
2 These include, but are not limited to Loewenstein and Spletzer (1999a, 1999b), Acemoglu and Pischke (1998, 
1999), Autor (2001), and Cappelli (2004).    3 
A primary reason firms give for offering these programs is to reduce turnover, which is 
an apparent challenge to standard human capital theory.
3  This paper examines empirically 
whether employees who participate in tuition reimbursement have higher retention rates using a 
case study analysis of workers at a non-profit institution. Results from the case study indicate 
that participation reduces employee turnover.  Hence, the firm’s motivation for offering this 
program is supported by this analysis: general skills training increases retention.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents the prevalence 
of tuition reimbursement programs using the Survey of Employer-Provided Training, 1995 
(SEPT95) and describes the typical characteristics of these programs. Section 3 reviews previous 
studies of tuition reimbursement, while the case study analysis is presented in Section 4. 
Conclusions and areas for future research are given in Section 5. 
 
2.0  Background on Tuition Reimbursement Programs  
 
2.1  Program Prevalence 
 
Employer-provided tuition reimbursement programs are widespread and constitute a 
nontrivial part of non-wage compensation. One of the few datasets that collects information on 
tuition reimbursement programs is SEPT95. This survey collects information on data on 
employer-provided training practices for a cross section of establishments. The survey was 
conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), part of the U.S. Department of Labor, from 
May to August of 1995 with the purpose of collecting nationally representative data (Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 2006a). The sample represents private, non-agriculture establishments 
employing 50 or more. The amount spent on these programs is substantial: these establishments 
spent $2.8 billion in 1994 on tuition reimbursement.
4 In addition, the trade magazine Workforce 
Management estimates that companies paid $10 billion toward tuition reimbursements in 2003.
5 
Hence, expenditures on tuition reimbursement programs represent a significant source of 
investment in general skills of employees and appear to be on the rise.  
                                                 
3 Increased retention is a response given by human resource professionals in interviews with the author. Cappelli 
(2004) and Corporate Leadership Council (2002) report the same finding. 
4 The confidence interval for this estimate is $2.6 to $3.0 billion 
5 Workforce Management, May 1, 2004. Copyright 2004 Crain Communications Inc.   4 
A substantial fraction of firms offer tuition reimbursement. Results from SEPT95 show 
that 61 percent of establishments employing 50 or more workers offer tuition reimbursement 
programs. Using the 1994 National Employer Survey of Educational Quality in the Workforce 
(NES-EQW), Lynch and Black (1998) report that 47 percent of firms employing 20 or more 
employees offer tuition reimbursement programs. The estimates from SEPT95 and 1994 NES-
EQW are comparable because larger establishments are more likely to offer a tuition 
reimbursement program (Frazis et al. 1998). Examining the access of workers to this program, 
over three-quarters of the employees that work in these establishments are offered tuition 
reimbursement by their employer. Hence, these general training programs are widespread and yet 
relatively unexamined in the academic literature. 
Using SEPT95 allows for a comparison of establishment characteristics across those with 
and without a tuition reimbursement program. Seventy-five percent of respondents in SEPT95 
offer a tuition reimbursement program, but 14 percent of these firms had zero expenditures on 
reimbursements in 1994. Unfortunately, SEPT95 does not contain information on the specifics of 
these tuition reimbursement programs so these data cannot be used to evaluate how plan 
characteristics affect participation or retention rates. However, expenditures of $0 for 1994 imply 
a participation rate of zero for the entire year. To be considered as having a tuition 
reimbursement program in this analysis, firms must indicate that they both have a program and 
have positive expenditures in 1994. Using this requirement, 64 percent of establishments have an 
operational tuition reimbursement program.  
Table 1 shows mean characteristics of responding establishments by whether they offer 
tuition reimbursement. Establishments with a tuition reimbursement program, on average, offer 
more benefits, have higher wages, have lower separation rates, and employ more workers than 
firms without a program.
6  Table 2 shows how provision of tuition reimbursement programs 
varies by industry. Industries that are more production-intensive, such as mining and 
manufacturing, are more likely to offer this program. The financial, insurance, and real estate 
industry also has a high provision rate, which probably reflects the certifications and licensing 
required of employees in this industry. Establishments in retail have the lowest provision rate: 
only one-quarter of retail establishments offer tuition reimbursement. Table 3 shows that the 
                                                 
6 Separation rate = (current employment + hires – previous employment)/(.5*(current employment + previous 
employment), where previous employment is the number of employees on staff three months prior to survey.    5 
provision of tuition reimbursement across the U.S. is relatively uniform; establishments in New 
England and the Atlantic have slightly higher provision percentages.  
Whether tuition reimbursement is provided in conjunction with other training programs 
can be examined empirically. If tuition reimbursement programs are offered as a complement to 
other training programs, rather than as a substitute, then there is likely an interaction between 
firm-specific and general skills training. Table 1 shows that establishments with tuition 
reimbursement programs are both more likely to hire trainers from outside the firm and to 
employ in-house trainers.
7 In addition to this finding, the degree of firm-specificity is arguable 
higher in production-intensive industries. These results regarding the determinants of providing 
tuition reimbursement are consistent with tuition reimbursement programs being used to 
complement investments in firm-specific human capital, thereby increasing worker productivity 
at the current firm. If tuition reimbursement increases firm-specific skills, making her more 
valuable at the current firm relative to outside employers, then participation would increase 
retention – supporting the firm’s motivation for providing these programs. This paper examines 
the effect of participation in tuition reimbursement on the employee’s separation propensity. 
 
2.2  Program Characteristics 
 
Tuition reimbursement programs typically consist of three components: 1) a maximum 
reimbursement amount; 2) an eligibility requirement; and 3) a reimbursement policy based on 
academic performance. The first characteristic is affected by the tax-advantage status of these 
programs. Reimbursements from employer-provided programs are exempt from income taxation 
under Section 127 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code.
8 The maximum income exclusion for a 
single calendar year is $5,250, and reimbursements under this level are exempt from federal 
income tax, payroll tax, and state income tax. A 2002 survey by Eduventures of human resource 
professionals and managers at over 500 firms finds that 70 percent of firms offering a tuition 
reimbursement program cap annual reimbursement, and over half of these firms (57 percent) 
                                                 
7 Firms are classified as hiring an outside trainer if they had positive expenditures for this training category in 1994; 
similarly for expenditures on in-house trainers (fulltime or part-time). 
8 Section 127 of the Internal Revenue Code outlines the tax-advantaged status of educational assistance plans 
provided by employers: “Gross income of an employee does not include amounts paid or expenses incurred by the 
employer for educational assistance to the employee if the assistance is furnished pursuant to a [educational 
assistance] program” (26 U.S.C.§ 127).   6 
have maximums that exceed $4,000 (Eduventures 2003).
9  Table 4 shows the distribution of 
reimbursement maximums from the Eduventures survey.  The majority of firms impose a cap 
below or equal to the maximum annual tax exclusion of $5,250, but a substantial fraction of 
firms have reimbursement maximums that exceed the tax exempt limit or have no maximum 
reimbursement amount. Of those imposing a cap, the most common maximum is within the 
$4,000 to $5,250 range, reflecting the influence of the tax exclusion. 
Most firms in the Eduventures survey allow employees to become eligible for the 
program after six months of service; rarely do eligibility requirements exceed one year.  Twenty 
percent of firms impose service requirements after participation. Service requirements after 
participation are more common in plans that have unlimited tuition reimbursement. The 2002 
survey by Eduventures also reports that over 90 percent of programs have a minimum grade 
standard for reimbursement, typically set at a “C” or better. Many companies tie grades directly 
to reimbursement percentages, making the cost of participation higher for workers who receive 
lower grades.  The tuition reimbursement program analyzed in the case study has an eligibility 
requirement of one year of service and does not have a service requirement after participation. 
The maximum reimbursement amount is $5,250 for a single year and the program only 
reimburses costs of tuition for participants obtaining a “C” grade or better.  Hence, the case study 
program is typical in its reimbursement amount and requirements, making it a good candidate for 
case study analysis. 
In addition to the above characteristics, the firm must follow guidelines set by the U.S. 
Internal Revenue Code for tuition reimbursements to qualify for the aforementioned tax 
exclusion. A firm must have a written plan for the exclusive benefit of providing employees with 
educational assistance, the program must meet non-discrimination clauses, and employees cannot 
be offered a choice between educational assistance and other forms of compensation for 
reimbursements to qualify for the tax exclusion. Before 1978, all employer-provided educational 
expenses fell under Section 162 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code.  Section 162, enacted in 
1954, excludes employer-provided educational assistance from taxation as long as the 
coursework is “job-related”. Over time, the job-related requirement became narrowly interpreted 
                                                 
9 The survey was sponsored by Cenquest, a provider of managed education solutions, which helps companies create 
and manage tuition assistance programs (www.cenquest.com). Eduventures, who conducted the survey,  is an 
independent research and advisory firm of corporate, post-secondary, and pre-K-12 learning markets 
(www.eduventures.com).   7 
due to court case rulings, thus limiting the educational opportunities of employees in low-level 
positions relative to employees in higher-level positions who typically have broad job 
descriptions. The legislative intent of the tax exclusion in Section 127 was to provide educational 
opportunities at the workplace for lower-level employees – those employees who could not take 
advantage of educational assistance for job-related coursework because they were limited by 
narrow job descriptions.  Not only are tuition reimbursement program interesting to study from a 
labor economics perspective because they clearly meet Becker’s definition of investment in 
general skills, the tax-advantaged status of these programs makes them relevant to matters of 
public policy. 
 
3.0    Literature on Tuition Reimbursement Programs 
 
  Despite the prevalence of tuition reimbursement programs, few academic studies have 
looked explicitly at these programs. The primary reasons given by firms as to why they offer 
tuition reimbursement programs are: recruitment and retention. The first reason implies that 
tuition reimbursement programs are a non-wage benefit. The rationale for the second reason is 
that tuition reimbursement programs are training programs that affect worker productivity, and 
thus retention.  
 
3.1  Tuition Reimbursement Programs and Recruitment   
 
   The use of benefits as a recruiting device is prevalent in labor and personnel economics. 
Rosen’s (1986) work on “equalizing differences” established a theory for how non-wage benefits 
affect the composition of workers attracted to a firm. In the case of a tuition reimbursement, 
workers who value continuing education are willing to trade-off wages (at some rate) for tuition 
payments. This tradeoff implies that the incidence of tuition reimbursement is on the worker. The 
tax-advantaged status increases the value of a given level of tuition benefits; the value increases 
with the worker’s marginal tax rate.  
  A common reaction to these programs is to attribute their provision by firms solely to 
their tax-advantaged status. However, this overlooks the trade-off between wage and non-wage 
compensation. If total compensation reflects the value of a worker’s marginal product, then   8 
benefits and wages are substitutes at the margin. Firms offer tuition reimbursement instead of 
additional wages or other benefits if tuition benefits are more effective at attracting a certain type 
of workers.  The tax-advantaged status of tuition reimbursement programs increases the value of 
these benefits to a worker facing a positive tax rate, but cannot explain why a firm offers tuition 
benefits instead of other forms of compensation. 
  Cappelli (2004) addresses the effect of tuition reimbursement programs on recruitment by 
developing a model in which provision of these programs generates a separating equilibrium in 
which only high-ability workers choose to work at firms with a tuition program. Using 
educational attainment as a proxy for ability, Cappelli tests his theory using the 1997 National 
Employer Survey (NES-EQW) and finds that the average education attainment of new hires is 
higher for firms with tuition reimbursement programs, which is consistent with his theory if 
educational attainment is a direct measure of ability. However, the sharp prediction of his model 
– all high ability types participate – is inconsistent with empirical participation rates. 
Participation rates in tuition reimbursement programs by employees is typically between three 
and five percent.
10  The Corporate Leadership Council (2002) reports that low participation rates 
could be due to a lack of marketing by firms.  If employees lack information about the program, 
it cannot influence an employee’s selection of employer. 
Aside from the sharp prediction, the general idea of Cappelli’s (2004) model is attractive 
because it is consistent existing studies of sorting due to non-wage benefits (Rosen 1986). The 
low participation rates found empirically could be reconciled in his model by thinking of workers 
as attaching an option value to participation: non-participants at firms that offer the program 
could be systematically different (i.e. of higher ability) than workers at firms that do not offer 
this program if high ability workers are willing to trade-off wages for the option of 
participating.
11 Data on how implementation of a tuition reimbursement program affects the 
applicant pool would be ideal to test the effect of these program on recruitment. However, this 
type of data is difficult to obtain. Results from the case study in Section 4 provide inconclusive 
evidence that implementation of a tuition reimbursement program differentially affects new hires 
and existing employees in terms of the impact of participation on employee retention. 
                                                 
10 References include: Corporate Leadership Council, statistics from Watson Wyatt, Buddin and Kapur (2004), and 
conversations with HR personnel at firms with a program.  
11 Low participation rates could be explained by adding a exogenous shock that decreases the cost of participation, 
or by modeling heterogeneity in ability as a continuous distribution.   9 
   
3.2  Tuition Reimbursement and Retention 
 
  In contrast to using tuition benefits as a recruiting device, the claim by firms that they use 
tuition reimbursement programs to reduce turnover does not have support in the theoretical 
literature. Rather, the literature predicts the opposite: provision of general skills training would 
increase turnover.  Becker’s (1964) theory of investment in human capital argues that, because 
general skills are fully transferable (by definition) firms risk having their trained employees 
poached or “cherry-picked” by outside firms if they provide workers with general skills training. 
The labor market is assumed to be competitive, resulting in the worker’s wage set equal to the 
value of her marginal product. Because the worker captures the full return on the investment, 
Becker’s theory implies that the worker bears the full cost of general training. Because the 
market is competitive and skills are transferable, the worker is indifferent between employers. 
Therefore, even if the incidence of general skills training falls on the worker, turnover would be 
non-decreasing in the provision of general skills training. This disconnect between the theoretical 
literature and the intended use of these programs by firms presents an opportunity to analyze 
empirically the effect of tuition reimbursement programs on retention.   
  There are several case studies that examine the tuition reimbursement programs offered 
by the U.S. Department of Defense.
12 The two studies most similar in their econometric 
methodology to the case study analysis in this paper are Garcia, Arkes, and Trost (2000) and 
Buddin and Kapur (2005), which examine the impact of tuition reimbursement on retention in 
the U.S. Navy. Garcia, Arkes, and Trost (2000) follow a cohort of enlistees who began service in 
1992 and study the effect of participation on the probability of remaining with the Navy for at 
least six years. They find that participation increases the probability of staying in the Navy by 
nearly 13 percentage points.  
  Buddin and Kapur (2005) find the opposite: participation in tuition reimbursement 
decreases the probability of re-enlisting after four years by 16.5 percent. Buddin and Kapur 
criticize Garcia, Arkes, and Trost’s (2000) definition of retention and instead use re-enlistment 
after the end of a four-year contract as the relevant measure. Buddin and Kapur (2005) argue that 
                                                 
12 These include Boesel and Johnson (1988), Garcia and Joy (1998), Garcia, Arkes, and Trost (2000), and Buddin 
and Kapur (2002, 2005).   10 
the time window for which enlistees have access to participation in tuition reimbursement should 
be held fixed, and so they limit their sample only to those enlistees who served a full four-year 
contract. These two studies also differ in the variables used as exclusion restrictions in their 
bivariate probit estimation: Garcia, Arkes, and Trost (2000) use participation in the orientation 
session for educational opportunities offered to enlistees, while Buddin and Kapur (2005) use the 
enlistee’s proximity to a four-year college before enlistment and an interaction between the 
number of courses offered on base and the size of the base.  Buddin and Kapur argue that the 
instrument used by Garcia, Arkes, and Trost (2000) fails the exogeneity test.
13  
  While the exclusion restriction in Garcia, Arkes, and Trost (2000) is untenable, this paper 
does not agree with Buddin and Kapur’s (2005) criticism that the window of opportunity for 
participation needs to be held constant for “leavers” and “stayers”. If enlistees jointly determine 
their participation and retention decisions, constraining the duration of service to be the same 
across participants and non-participants imposes restrictions on the effect of the program. By 
using different criteria for their samples, Garcia, Arkes, and Trost (2000) and Buddin and Kapur 
(2005) are addressing slightly different research questions. Garcia, Arkes, and Trost (2000) 
examine the effect of participation on the probability of staying six years, while Buddin and 
Kapur (2005) analyze the effect of participation on the probability of staying a fifth year after 
already completing four years with the Navy. Even in the absence of these complications, 
generalizing results from the Armed Services to civilian workers is difficult due to the 
fundamentally different employment relationship. 
Benson, Finegold and Mohrman (2004) present a civilian analysis of the impact of 
participation in tuition reimbursement on retention using a case study of a large U.S. 
manufacturing firm (roughly 10,000 employees). Employees at this firm have a high 
participation rate in the tuition program – nearly 60 percent – which may be due to the program’s 
unlimited reimbursement of tuition, stock rewards for degree completion, and the fact that the 
firm strives to be a leader in the provision of continued education for its workers. This number is 
also inflated because it includes individuals who took only a single course rather than limiting 
the sample to those enrolled in a degree program. Hence, their study examines an atypical tuition 
reimbursement program in terms of characteristics and participation rates. Benson, Finegold and 
                                                 
13 Participation in the orientation session is not random, but is positively correlated with an individual’s intention to 
use the program, and thus also is correlated with the probability of staying in the Navy.    11 
Mohrman (2004) use a Cox-proportional hazard model to analyze how degree completion affects 
the probability of leaving the firm between January 1996 and June 2000. They argue that 
promotion after degree completion would reduce the probability of leaving because it produces a 
better match between responsibilities and skills sets.  However, their theory falls short of fully 
explaining their empirical findings. They find that promotion decreases the probability of leaving 
for employees who obtain a graduate degree. However, these individuals have a greater 
probability of leaving than non-participants. Additionally, promotion does not affect the 
probability of leaving for those employees earning a Bachelor’s or Associate’s degree. More 
importantly, their assumption that hazard rates are proportional might not be appropriate. They 
claim there is a sharp increase in the hazard upon degree completion, which suggests that the 
effect of participation on the separation hazard is not proportional over time. 
  While few studies examine tuition reimbursement programs, there have been many 
studies that examine the provision of general skills training by employers. These studies develop 
models in which a variety of mechanisms, such as asymmetric information or mobility costs, 
could create a wedge between wages and productivity. This wedge provides firms with an 
incentive to offer and pay for general skills training.
14 These studies relax Becker’s assumption 
that labor market is competitive to explain why firms offer general training.  
This paper contributes to the literature by empirically evaluating the effect of employer-
provided general training – provided through tuition reimbursement programs – on employee 
retention. If general training decreases employee turnover then a central prediction of Becker’s 
model is incorrect. In order to continue to use this standard theory, it would need to be amended 
to account for this negative relationship between general training and turnover. Allowing for 
general human capital and firm-specific human capital to interact is one possible modification to 
the standard model, which is addressed briefly in Section 4.4.  
 
                                                 
14 These include, but are not limited to: Black and Lynch (1998), Loewenstein and Spletzer (1999) and Acemoglu 
and Pischke (1999a, 1999b), Autor(2001), and Cappelli (2004).   12 
4.0  Case Study Program: CSP  
 
  To examine the impact of tuition reimbursement programs on employee retention, this 
paper analyses data from a single firm as well as from a cross-section of firms. This section 
focuses on the case study, presenting the program characteristics, an econometric framework, 
and the results. The data were obtained from a non-profit institution in the education sector, 
which implemented a tuition reimbursement program in September 1999. (The case study 
program will be referred to as CSP in the remainder of the text.)  Employees considered in this 
analysis are staff members in supervisory and non-supervisory positions who were employed on 
December 15, 1999, and those who were hired between December 15, 1999 and September 1, 
2001.  A panel of observations was constructed based on seven “point-in-time” observations 
from administrative records. Individuals are observed on December 15 of each year from 1999 to 
2005. The data include gender, age, and race as well as start date, job characteristics, and annual 
wage rates. One shortcoming of the data is that those employees who start and end employment 
between December 15 of one year and December 15 of the subsequent year are not included in 
the sample. Individual records of participation in CSP include the amount reimbursed, the degree 
type, and the major or area of concentration from September 1, 1999 to August 31, 2004.
15 Total 
expenditure on tuition reimbursement over these five years totaled over $2 million dollars 
(nominal) with a participation rate of 4.5 percent. 
   
4.1  Characteristics of CSP and Descriptive Statistics 
 
As mentioned in Section 2, employees are required to have one year of service to be 
eligible for CSP.  Employees need to be admitted into a degree program, but the program does 
not need to be job-related. The intent of CSP at the case study institution is given below: 
[CSP] supports employee development by providing partial or full reimbursement of 
costs of courses, seminars and workshops that enable employees to improve performance 
in current jobs, prepare for career development, or meet requirements of degree programs 
related to current performance or planned career development (Administrative Guide 
Memo 22.11). 
 
                                                 
15 Major or area of concentration was not available for 22 participants.   13 
The employee’s supervisor must approve the request to participate in CSP, but this is not a 
binding constraint since the employee can appeal directly to the benefits department for 
reimbursement if her supervisor does not grant the request.  A staff member working full-time 
(more than 30 hours per week) qualifies for $5,250 in reimbursement per year; this amount is 
pro-rated for members working part-time. The maximum reimbursement amount was $2,000 for 
the first two years of the program, September 1, 1999 through August 31, 2001, but was 
increased to $5,250 as of September 1, 2001.  CSP qualifies under Section 127 of the Internal 
Revenue Code, allowing reimbursements to be exempt from income and payroll taxation  
Under CSP, reimbursements are only allowable for costs of tuition fees. Tuition 
reimbursements are made directly to the institution prior to the quarter or semester.  The 
employee assumes responsibility of satisfactory completion of the course (grade C or better); if 
not, the funds must be repaid in total to the employer.  
Table 5 displays sample means for workers used in the case study analysis. Participants 
in CSP differ from non-participating employees in terms of observable demographic and 
employment variables. Participants are more likely to be female, younger, identify themselves as 
Black, have a lower starting wage and are less likely to be in a supervisory role.
16  Of those who 
participate between September 1, 1999 through August 31, 2004, average total reimbursement 
was approximately $5,200 and participants spend an average of two years in the program. The 
participation rate of an employee’s peers is also higher for participants. Peer groups were 
constructed using both the location of an employee’s department and the general classification of 
her job to define a group of workers whose participation behavior could influence that individual 
employee’s participation decision, such as through the dissemination of information about the 
program. The peer participation rate assigned to each employee does not include that particular 
employee’s participation behavior. This variable will be used later in the paper as an exclusion 
restriction for the separation equation in the econometric analysis.  
  Tables 6 and 7 show the retention behavior of non-participants and participants. The raw 
data show that participants are less likely to leave in each year compared to non-participants. The 
largest difference in the leaving percentages occurs for the three-year time window, but the 
                                                 
16 “Exempt” and “Non-exempt” refer to whether the employee is subject to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 
(FLSA), which establishes minimum wage and over-time pay laws for full-time and part-time workers in the private 
and government sectors. Workers who are non-exempt from FLSA are those paid on an hourly basis and occupy 
non-supervisory positions; salary of exempt workers must also meet the minimum wage.    14 
difference still persists for the five-year mark. Whether the worker separates from the institution 
before five years is the outcome evaluated in this study. Unfortunately, the data do not contain 
information on degree completion, so the retention behavior of participants after completing their 
coursework cannot be directly examined. The five-year time window is used as an approximation 
for degree completion. 
  Figures 1 and 2 graphically show differences between participants and non-participants in 
their propensities to separate from the institution using plots of the survival functions. These 
survival functions use actual employment start dates, but end dates are randomly assigned for the 
year in which the employee leaves the institution to produce a smoothed curve.
17  The survival 
function of participants lies to the right of non-participants, meaning that for any year of service, 
participants are more likely to still be employed by the institution.  Differences in survival rates 
are largest just before three years of service.   
Figures 3 and 4 show that survival rates differ by the type of degree pursued: participants 
in undergraduate programs have higher survival rates than those in graduate programs.  The 
analysis in the next section examines whether this difference between degrees persists when 
controlling for characteristics of the participants. While these tables and figures show lower 
survival rates for non-participants, a proper analysis of the effect of participation on retention 
needs to account for differences across individuals and the interdependence of the participation 
and retention decision. The next section of the paper will examine how participation affects 
retention using econometric analyses to control for differences in observable characteristics as 
well as unobservable characteristics.  
 
4.2  Estimation 
 
  This section models the event of an employee leaving the institution using a latent 
variable framework.  The individual compares the utility from staying with the employer to that 
obtained from separating. The propensity to separate from the employer is a continuous variable, 
but the observed outcome is binary, taking a value equal to 1 if the individual separates, and 
equal to 0 otherwise. The likelihood of leaving depends on observable characteristics, X, 
                                                 
17 For employees hired before September 1999, length of service is measured as the difference between 
implementation of the program (September 1, 1999) and end date, or censoring date (December 15, 2005) when 
relevant.    15 
participation in CSP, P, and factors unobservable to the researcher, e. Let S* be the underlying 
index – unobservable to the researcher – that determines whether the individual separates from 
the employer within a specified time frame:   




- < + Û <




P X S if
P X S if
S
' 0 * 0
' 0 * 1
           (2) 
If we assume e to have a standard normal distribution, then we can estimate how worker 
characteristics affect the probability of separating from the institution using a probit model.  
  The same framework can be applied to participation in CSP because participation is also 
a binary outcome.  Let P* be the underlying latent variable that determines whether the 
individual participates, while Z represents individual characteristics and let u be unobservable 
characteristics. Again, the individual compares the utility from participating to that from not 
participating. 
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' 0 * 0
' 0 * 1
            (4) 
As with the analysis of the probability of separation, determinants of participation can be 
examined using a probit model if u has a standard normal distribution. 
  If participation in CSP were exogenous in equation 1, then a would measure the effect of 
participation in CSP on the probability of separation. For participation to be exogenous, the 
decision to participate cannot be related to the decision to leave the employer in terms of 
unobservable characteristics, or cov(e,u) = 0.  However, because participation in CSP affects 
employment and promotion opportunities due to an increase in general skills, arguing that the 
two decisions are uncorrelated is tenuous. This paper models the two decisions jointly, allowing 
for participation in CSP to be endogenous in equation 1, or that cov(e,u) ¹ 0.  The distribution of  
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Equations 1 and 2 are estimated jointly using bivariate probit maximum likelihood estimation. 
Garcia, Arkes and Trost (2000) and Buddin and Kapur (2005) use this technique in their studies 
of the U.S. Navy. In order to estimate the model, Z in equation 3 needs to include a variable that 
affects the likelihood of participating, but does not affect the likelihood of leaving (i.e. not 
contained in X from equation 1). This paper uses an information effect or knowledge “spillover”, 
measured by the participation rate of peers, to satisfy this exclusion restriction. Peer groups were 
created based on the division (18 in total) in which the employee worked and a broadly defined 
job classification (administrative, professional, researcher, or manager). The participation rate of 
peers attached to each individual does not include the participation decision of that particular 
individual. This rate is used as a measure of how informed an individual is about CSP.
18
  Because the sample consists of both employees hired before and after the implementation 
of CSP, the empirical analysis will be conducted on two groups: 1) employees hired before 
September 1, 1999; and 2) employees hired after September 1, 1999. The groups need to be 
separated because, as discussed in Section 3, implementation of CSP could affect the applicant 
pool. The effect of CSP on retention for future hires will be determined based on results 
collected from the second group, which is the measure most applicable to firms who have an 
established program. If a firm is considering implementing a tuition reimbursement program, the 
effect of CSP on current and future workers is relevant.  
 
4.3  Results from Case Study 
 
The first set of results estimate the effect of participation in CSP on the probability of 
separating from the employer (voluntarily or involuntarily) within 5 years when participation is 
treated as exogenous. Table 8 lists the marginal effects from a simple probit estimation with 
leave as the dependent variable. For workers hired before CSP was implemented, S = 1 if they 
separate from institution within five years measured from September 1, 1999; and = 0 otherwise. 
                                                 
18 The direction of the effect in unclear: Does the participation of peers inform the individual or does participation 
by the individual inform her peers? While it does not matter for the purposes of this study, a robustness check was 
performed that assigned participation rates by workers hired before September 1, 1999 in the first year of the 
program (1999) to new hires. Because these new hires were not eligible to participate in the first year due to the 
eligibility rule while the existing employees were, the direction of this information effect is clear.  By distinguishing 
between these two cohorts, concerns regarding whether the individual and her peer group experience the same shock 
to their participation probabilities are also mitigated. This alternative measure of peer participation does not affect 
the results.   17 
For workers hired after implementation, S = 1 if separate within five years of hire date; and S = 0 
otherwise.  Individual and employment characteristics, such as age, wage, and years of service, 
are taken as of December 15 of the first year observed. Participation in CSP is equal to 1 if the 
individual ever participated in the program from September 1, 1999 through August 31, 2003. 
This definition of participation is used because when workers participate, they typically spend 
the maximum amount possible, which corresponds to a binary decision.
19  
As seen in Table 8, if participation in CSP were exogenous, participation would lower the 
probability of leaving by over 20 percentage points for employees hired before or after 
September 1, 1999. This impact on retention is equivalent to the effect of being three and a half 
years older, or having six additional years of experience (as of December 15, 1999) for those 
employees hired before September, 1999.  For recent hires, the effect is similar to being four and 
half years older. 
  Table 9 separates the effect of undergraduate and graduate degrees on retention assuming 
exogeneity of participation. The effect of pursuing an undergraduate degree in CSP is roughly 
one and a half times as large as the effect of pursuing a graduate degree across the two groups. 
However, if participation is endogenous, these estimates of how participation in CSP affects 
retention are inconsistent.  
Tables 10 and 11 display the marginal effects from the bivariate probit maximum 
likelihood estimation for employees hired before and after September 1, 1999, which allows for 
an interdependence between participation and retention decisions. For those hired before 
implementation of CSP, the probability of participation is significantly higher for females 
(relative to males) and Blacks (relative to those identifying themselves as White), and lower for 
Asians and for those with higher weekly wages. While the magnitude of the marginal effects 
appears small, they are influential when compared to the average participation rate of 4.5 
percent.  The probability of participating in CSP increases in step with the participation rate of 
peers. The probability of leaving is decreasing (at a decreasing rate) in age and experience, and is 
lower for Hispanics and Asians. At mean values, a $500 dollar increase in the weekly starting 
wage increases the probability of leaving by one percent.  
                                                 
19 The results do not change when spending as a percent of the maximum reimbursement amount is used instead of 
the binary indicator.   18 
The impact of participation in CSP on retention is estimated as negative for both groups 
and significantly different from zero for those hired after the program was implemented (hired 
after September 1, 1999). As opposed to the estimates in Table 8 when participation is assumed 
to be exogenous, the estimated effect of participation in CSP is only slightly negative and not 
significantly different from zero for those employees hired before September 1, 1999. The 
change in the magnitude can be attributed to the correlation between the unobservable 
characteristics. A negative correlation implies that individuals (those hired before September 1, 
1999) who participate in CSP were those predisposed to staying at the institution.  
  For those hired after September 1, 1999, participation in CSP is significantly higher for 
workers in a non-supervisory role and is increasing in wage (Table 11). Participation in CSP has 
a large effect on retention: it reduces the probability of separating within five years by 50 
percentage points. The correlation between the error terms is positive and significant at the ten 
percent level. A positive correlation implies that those individuals who are more likely to 
participate in CSP are more inclined to leave within 5 years.  
  The estimated effect of participation in CSP on retention in Tables 10 and 11 is a 
specification in which the type of degree pursued does not matter for separation rates. A second 
specification is found in Tables 12 through 15, which allows the effect to vary by degree 
pursued. Tables 12 and 13 give the estimate for how pursuing an undergraduate in CSP affects 
retention. The effect is large and negative for both groups of hires: the probability of leaving 
within five years is reduced by over 40 percent for those hired before September 1, 1999, and 
nearly 60 percent for recent hires. The correlation between the error terms is positive for both 
groups, meaning that those most likely to participate are those predisposed to separating from the 
institution. 
  The effects of pursuing a graduate degree in CSP on retention are listed in Tables 14 and 
15. Unlike undergraduate degrees, the effect of pursuing a graduate degree differs across the two 
cohorts of employees. For those hired before CSP was implemented, pursuing a graduate degree 
increases the probability of leaving the institution by 22 percentage points; although, the effect is 
not statistically significant at conventional levels.  The correlation between the errors is negative 
for this group, meaning that those who are more likely to pursue a graduate degree are also more 
likely to stay.    19 
For those hired after September 1, 1999, pursuing a graduate degree reduces the 
probability of leaving within five years by fifty percent. Similar to undergraduate degrees, the 
correlation between the errors is positive. Hence, those employees pursuing graduate degrees 
who were hired before September 1, 1999 behave differently from the other three groups of 
participants.
20  
   These results indicate that participation in CSP increases retention for those employees 
hired after the program was implemented, and for those employees hired before implementation 
who choose to pursue undergraduate degrees.  This analysis shows that participation in CSP is 
endogenous: the correlation between the error terms is positive for the aforementioned groups. 
Because of this endogeneity, single-equation estimation of the effect of CSP on the probability of 
separation underestimates the impact of participation on retention due to the positive correlation 
between the error terms. Participation in CPS decreases the probability of separating from the 
employer within 5 years by 50 percentage points when participation is allowed to be 
endogenous, up from 20 percent point decrease in the probability of separation when 
participation is treated exogenously. Hence, the effect of CSP on retention is even larger in 
magnitude when we take into account the correlation between the unobservable factors contained 
in the error terms.  
  For those employees hired before implementation of CSP who pursue graduate degrees, 
CSP reduces retention. The correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity affecting 
participation and separation is negative for these workers, which means that those more likely to 
participate are less likely to separate from the institution within five years. When treated 
exogenously, participation appears to decrease the probability of leaving by 18 percentage 
points; however, when participation is modeled as endogenous, participation increases the 
probability of leaving by nearly 22 percentage points. Hence, participation in CSP accelerates 
departure from the institution for those existing employees who choose to pursue graduate 
degrees.  
  This case study finds that tuition reimbursement programs increase retention of 
new hires. Hence, this paper finds empirical support for the explanation given by firms for 
providing tuition reimbursement programs – to increase employee retention – despite the 
                                                 
20 This difference could be explained by dynamics leading to the implementation of CSP, which is currently being 
explored.   20 
predictions of the standard theory of human capital that provision of general training could 
increase turnover. It is important to note that implementation of a program appears to affect 
existing and future employees differentially. This difference provides some evidence that tuition 
programs affect the composition of a firm’s applicant pool.  However, this evidence is not fully 
conclusive due to the fact that it only applies to those workers pursuing graduate degrees.  
Because CSP is a typical program in terms of its characteristics, this paper’s findings improve 
the literature’s understanding of tuition reimbursement programs and their effect on retention, 
especially for civilian employees.  
   
4.4   Interpreting the Results 
 
The result that general skills decrease turnover can be interpreted within standard human 
capital theory if general and firm-specific skills interact, such as through complementarities. In 
the extreme, this necessarily holds because basic, general skills such as writing and reading are 
essential for further skill development. Recall that investment in firm-specific skills lowers 
turnover because rents from the investment are shared between the worker and firm; both parties 
have an incentive to continue employment because rents only accrue if the relationship is 
maintained. If provision of general skills training by a firm increases the stock or productivity of 
firm-specific skills, then general skills training could reduce turnover.  
If complementarities exist between general and firm-specific human capital in 
production, general skills training could increase employee retention. Acemoglu and Pischke 
(1999a, 1999b) argue that if general and firm-specific human capital are complements, wage 
structures could become compressed, thereby giving firms an incentive to provide general skills 
training. Acemoglu and Pischke define compression in the wage structure to mean that profits 
from trained workers are higher than those from untrained workers.
21 With complementarities 
between general and specific human capital, general skills acquired through participation in 
tuition reimbursement could increase the productivity of firm-specific human capital, thereby 
increasing employee retention.  
                                                 
21 Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a, 1999b) list several other market imperfections that could result in compressed 
wages, including search costs, mobility costs, and minimum wage laws.   
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The case study shows that workers who are predisposed to having a higher probability of 
separating from the institution are more likely to participate in the tuition program. This suggests 
that these workers may have intended to acquire general skills through tuition reimbursement to 
make a career or firm change. However, participation substantially reduces the probability of 
leaving within five years. This is consistent with participants accumulating firm-specific human 
capital during the time period before they become eligible and during participation in the 
program, as well as possibly due to the increase in productivity of firm-specific skills from the 
interaction of these skills with general skills acquired through tuition reimbursement. Because 
those who participate stand to gain the most from participation in terms of wage increases and 
promotion opportunities, tuition reimbursement programs are effective at lowering the separation 
rate of the most ambitious and marketable employees. 
    There are other mechanisms that could result in general skills training reducing turnover 
in the presence of firm-specific human capital. Lazear (2005) presents a model in which all skills 
are general, but how these skills are combined in production is specific to the firm. Hence, in his 
model providing general skills training is essentially equivalent to investing in firm-specific skills. 
Alternatively, firms could use general training as an insurance mechanism: if workers are 
reluctant to work at a firm which requires investment in firm-specific human capital due to the 
risk of wage loss in the event of involuntary separation, firms could offer general training as a 
way to mitigate this risk (Feuer, Glick, and Desai 1987).  Additionally, if providing general skills 
training attracts a type of worker who values investment in human capital, these workers likely 
have a lower discount rate, and thus could be less likely to turnover a priori. For the case of 
tuition reimbursement programs, in particular, participation could increase the amount of firm-
specific skills if these skills increase over time because coursework takes several semesters to 
complete. Service length requirements before and after participation would add to this effect 
(Cappelli 2004). 
It is important to note that the presence of firm-specific human capital is not required for 
the provision of general training if other market imperfections are present (Acemoglu and 
Pischke 1999a, 1999b). While these rigidities, such as mobility costs, could explain why firms 
invest in general human capital of its workers, they cannot explain why the provision of general 
training reduces separation rates.  Evidence from SEPT95 indicates that firms who offer tuition 
reimbursement programs are more likely to offer other types of training programs.  Because   22 
“high-training” firms are more likely to offer tuition reimbursement programs, this suggests that 
these firms rely more heavily on firm-specific skills in production. Testing this hypothesis 
explicitly would require developing an index of firm-specificity, which could then be related to 
the provision of tuition reimbursement programs.  
 
5.0  Concluding Remarks 
 
  Tuition reimbursement programs are a type of general training commonly offered by 
employers. Counter to the prediction of Becker’s theory of investment in human capital, firms 
claim that they use these programs to increase employee retention. Results from the case study 
show that participation in CSP substantially reduces the probability of separating from a firm: 
participation by those employees hired after the program was implemented reduced their 
probability of leaving within five years by over 50 percentage points. This result overturns the 
prediction of standard theory that investment in general human capital by firms increases 
turnover. However, the establishment-level factors that determine which firms offer this general 
training program suggest that it is offered to complement investments in firm-specific human 
capital. By allowing for an interaction between firm-specific and general human capital, the 
empirical finding that general training reduces turnover can be interpreted within standard 
theory.  
A shortcoming of the case study analysis is whether the findings can be generalized to 
other employers and programs. While the tuition reimbursement program is typical in terms of 
its program characteristics, future work will examine the effect of tuition reimbursement 
programs on turnover rates using the cross section of establishments such as those surveyed in 
the SEPT95. In addition, future work will extend the case study analysis by using a hazard rate 
model rather than modeling separation as a binary outcome. 
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Table 1: Means of Firm Characteristics 
(SEPT95)￿ Full Sample￿ No Tuition  
Reimbursement ￿
Offer Tuition  
Reimbursement ￿
Number of Employees  668  210  926 
Average Monthly Wage*  $2,966  $2,470  $3,267 
One of Multiple Establishments (0 or 1)*  40.21%  31.33%  45.59% 
Separation Rate  11.00%  16.89%  7.68% 
Total Number of Benefits (0 to 11)  6.1  4.9  6.8 
Training Programs    
 Tuition Reimbursement Program  63.95%  -  100.00% 
Hire In-house trainers  45.13%  23.47%  57.48% 
Hire trainers from outside the firm  72.18%  50.67%  84.15% 
Occupation Composition   ￿
Managers  10.24%  8.65%  11.13% 
Professionals  14.68%  8.14%  18.37% 
Sales  7.80%  10.32%  6.39% 
Administrative Support  13.37%  10.33%  15.08% 
Service  7.97%  12.95%  5.16% 
Production   45.90%  49.51%  43.87% 
       
Number of Firms  1057  381  676 
       
*Not available for all States (N = 838; 522 offer tuition reimbursement and 316 do not). 
Column 3 Significantly Different from Column 4 at 1% Level 
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Table 2:  
Tuition Programs by Industry 
(SEPT95)￿
% in Sample￿ % Offer Tuition  
Reimbursement ￿
Mining  11.64%  73.98% 
Construction  11.54%  50.00% 
Non-Durable Manufacturing  11.54%  72.13% 
Durable Manufacturing  13.25%  82.86% 
Transportation/Utilities  10.50%  62.16% 
Wholesale  10.12%  54.21% 
Retail  9.37%  26.26% 
Financial/Insurance/Real Estate  9.93%  81.90% 








Table 3:  
Tuition Reimbursement by Region 
(SEPT95)￿
% in Sample￿ % Offer Tuition  
Reimbursement ￿
New England  5.62%  81.36% 
Middle Atlantic  9.81%  70.87% 
East North Central  19.52%  66.34% 
West North Central  8.10%  68.24% 
South Atlantic  16.38%  70.93% 
South Central  19.62%  53.88% 
Mountain  7.52%  63.29% 
Pacific  13.43%  54.61%   28 
 
Table 4: Distribution of Maximum 
Reimbursements for Tuition Programs￿
Less than $1,000￿ 6.22%￿
$1,001 to $2,500￿ 19.12%￿
$2,501 to $4,000￿ 15.67%￿
$4,001 to $5,250￿ 19.82%￿
$5,251 to $7,000￿ 4.84%￿


















Leave within 5 years￿ 48.32%￿ 33.25%￿
Weekly Wage ($2001)￿ $1,485￿ $1,237￿
Supervisor (Exempt)￿ 62.88%￿ 48.31%￿
Non-Supervisor (Non-Exempt)￿ 37.12%￿ 51.69%￿
Hired Before Sept. 1999￿ 67.86%￿ 62.85%￿
Years in Tuition Program￿ -￿ 1.96￿
Tuition Spending (nominal)￿ -￿ $5,213￿




Bolded = Participants and Non-Participants different at 5% significance level￿
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Table 6:  Retention of Participants  (Unconditional)￿
Year Hired￿ Number￿ % Leave before 
3 Years￿
% Leave before 
4 years￿
% Leave before 
5 years￿
1999 or before￿ 253￿ 13.83%￿ 20.95%￿ 30.43%￿
2000￿ 74￿ 11.84%￿ 19.74%￿ 32.89%￿





Table 7:  Retention of Non-Participants  (Unconditional)￿






1999 or before￿ 5621￿ 33.45%￿ 39.35%￿ 44.39%￿
2000￿ 1378￿ 41.51%￿ 51.16%￿ 58.85%￿
2001￿ 983￿ 41.20%￿ 50.05%￿ 56.97%￿
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Table 8:  Probability of Separating from Employer Before 5 years￿
Probit Model:  Pr(S=1)￿ Hired Before Sept., 1999￿ Hired After Sept., 1999￿
￿ dF/dX￿ St. Error￿ dF/dX￿ St. Error￿
Participation in CSP￿ -0.217￿ 0.027**￿ -0.238￿ 0.042**￿
Years of Service￿ -0.034￿ 0.003**￿ 0.136￿ 0.149￿
Years of Service - Squared￿ 0.001￿ 0.000**￿ -0.274￿ 0.143￿
Female￿ 0.010￿ 0.015￿ 0.007￿ 0.021￿
Age￿ -0.062￿ 0.004**￿ -0.050￿ 0.006**￿
Age - Squared￿ 0.001￿ 0.000**￿ 0.001￿ 0.000**￿
Black￿ 0.034￿ 0.031￿ -0.019￿ 0.046￿
Hispanic￿ -0.055￿ 0.026*￿ -0.080￿ 0.038*￿
Asian￿ -0.087￿ 0.018**￿ -0.101￿ 0.025**￿
Non-Supervisor (Not Exempt)￿ -0.018￿ 0.016￿ -0.072￿ 0.023**￿
Weekly Wage (in thousands), $2001￿ 0.020￿ 0.010*￿ -0.045￿ 0.015**￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Observations￿ 5826￿ ￿ 2788￿ ￿
Log-Likelihood￿ -3565.0￿ ￿ -1790.1￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
* significant at 5% level  ** significant at 1% level￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
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Table 9:  Probability of Separating from Employer Before 5 years￿
Probit Model:   Pr(S=1)￿ Hired Before Sept., 1999￿ Hired After Sept., 1999￿
￿ dF/dX￿ St. Error￿ dF/dX￿ St. Error￿
Graduate Degree ￿ -0.180￿ .036**￿ -0.204￿ .051**￿
Undergraduate Degree￿ -0.267￿ 0.36**￿ -0.307￿ .066**￿
Years of Service￿ -0.034￿ 0.000**￿ 0.135￿ 0.149￿
Years of Service - Squared￿ 0.001￿ 0.000**￿ -0.274￿ 0.143￿
Female￿ 0.010￿ 0.512￿ 0.007￿ 0.021￿
Age￿ -0.062￿ 0.000**￿ -0.049￿ .006**￿
Age - Squared￿ 0.001￿ 0.000**￿ 0.001￿ .000***￿
Black￿ 0.035￿ 0.262￿ -0.015￿ 0.046￿
Hispanic￿ -0.054￿ 0.040*￿ -0.078￿ .038*￿
Asian￿ -0.087￿ 0.000**￿ -0.101￿ .025**￿
Non-Supervisor (Not Exempt)￿ -0.017￿ 0.311￿ -0.071￿ .023**￿
Weekly Wage (in thousands), $2001￿ 0.020￿ 0.046*￿ -0.045￿ .015**￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Observations￿ 5826￿ ￿ 2788￿ ￿
Log-Likelihood￿ -3563.6￿ ￿ -1789.4￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
* significant at 5% level  ** significant at 1% level￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
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Table 10:  Probability of Participating in CSP and 
 Separating from Employer before 5 years￿
Bivariate Probit Model￿ Pr(CSP=1)￿ Pr(S=1)￿
Hired Before Sept., 1999￿ dF/dX￿ St. Error￿ dF/dX￿ St. Error￿
Participation in CSP￿ ￿ ￿ -0.0299￿ 0.2291￿
Years of Service￿ 0.0014￿ 0.0010￿ -0.0340￿ .0026**￿
Years of Service - Squared￿ -0.0001￿ 0.0000￿ 0.0007￿ .0001**￿
Female￿ 0.0096￿ .0045*￿ 0.0071￿ 0.0155￿
Age￿ -0.0002￿ 0.0016￿ -0.0607￿ .0048**￿
Age-squared￿ 0.0000￿ 0.0000￿ 0.0006￿ .0001**￿
Black￿ 0.0273￿ .0120*￿ 0.0264￿ 0.0318￿
Hispanic￿ 0.0045￿ 0.0079￿ -0.0565￿ .0260*￿
Asian￿ -0.0127￿ .0046*￿ -0.0834￿ .0182**￿
Non-Supervisor (Not Exempt)￿ 0.0023￿ 0.0054￿ -0.0209￿ 0.0166￿
Weekly Wage (in thousands), $2001￿ -0.0122￿ .0059*￿ 0.0209￿ .0102*￿
Participation in CSP by Peers (%)￿ 0.0100￿ .0019**￿  ￿  ￿
Correlation Between Errors￿ -0.2516￿ 0.2668￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Log-Likelihood￿ -4488.3￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Observations￿ 5826￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
* significant at 5% level  ** significant at 1% level￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
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Table 11:  Probability of Participating in CSP and  
Separating from Employer before 5 years￿
Bivariate Probit Model￿ Pr(CSP=1)￿ Pr(S=1)￿
Hired After Sept., 1999￿ dF/dX￿ St. Error￿ dF/dX￿ St. Error￿
Participation in CSP￿ ￿ ￿ -0.5188￿ .0788**￿
Years of Service ￿ 0.0667￿ 0.0599￿ 0.1521￿ 0.1476￿
Years of Service - Squared￿ -0.0279￿ 0.0559￿ -0.2693￿ 0.1419￿
Female￿ -0.0024￿ 0.0082￿ 0.0061￿ 0.0209￿
Age￿ 0.0010￿ 0.0028￿ -0.0493￿ .0062**￿
Age - Squared￿ 0.0000￿ 0.0000￿ 0.0005￿ .0001**￿
Black￿ 0.0243￿ 0.0201￿ -0.0071￿ 0.0452￿
Hispanic￿ -0.0062￿ 0.0125￿ -0.0824￿ .0373*￿
Asian￿ 0.0078￿ 0.0098￿ -0.0948￿ .0246*￿
Non-Supervisor (Not Exempt)￿ 0.0288￿ .0094**￿ -0.0585￿ .0239*￿
Weekly Wage (in thousands), $2001￿ 0.0121￿ .0056*￿ -0.0422￿ .0148*￿
  Participation in CSP by Peers (%)￿ 0.0148￿ .0033**￿  ￿  ￿
Correlation Between Errors￿ 0.5051￿ 0.2379￿ ￿ ￿
Log-Likelihood￿ -2317.2￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Observations￿ 2788￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
* significant at 5% level  ** significant at 1% level￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  34 
 
Table 12:  Probability of Pursuing an Undergraduate Degree in CSP and Separating from 
Employer before 5 years￿
Bivariate Probit Model￿ Pr(Undergrad=1)￿ Pr(S=1)￿
Hired Before Sept., 1999￿ dF/dX￿ St. Error￿ dF/dX￿ St. Error￿
Undergraduate Degree  in CSP￿ ￿ ￿ -0.4197￿ .0285**￿
Years of Service￿ 0.0004￿ 0.0005￿ -0.0335￿ .0026**￿
Years of Service - Squared￿ 0.0000￿ 0.0008￿ 0.0008￿ .0001**￿
Female￿ 0.0040￿ 0.0026￿ 0.0107￿ 0.0152￿
Age￿ 0.0005￿ 0.0009￿ -0.0609￿ .0044**￿
Age-squared￿ 0.0000￿ 0.0000￿ 0.0006￿ 0.0001**￿
Black￿ 0.0136￿ 0.0076￿ 0.0433￿ 0.0313￿
Hispanic￿ 0.0075￿ 0.0057￿ -0.0480￿ 0.0263￿
Asian￿ -0.0010￿ 0.0030￿ -0.0829￿ .0176**￿
Non-Supervisor (Not Exempt)￿ 0.0131￿ .0042**￿ -0.0051￿ 0.0172￿
Weekly Wage (in thousands), $2001￿ -0.0015￿ 0.0031￿ 0.0215￿ .0102*￿
Participation in CSP by Peers (%)￿ 0.0024￿ .0011*￿  ￿  ￿
Correlation Between Errors￿ 0.5522￿ 0.3155￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Log-Likelihood￿ -4027.9￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Observations￿ 5826￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
* significant at 5% level  ** significant at 1% level￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
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Table 13:   Probability of Pursuing an Undergraduate Degree in CSP  
and Separating from Employer before 5 years￿
Bivariate Probit Model￿ Pr(Undergrad=1)￿ Pr(S=1)￿
Hired After Sept., 1999￿ dF/dX￿ St. Error￿ dF/dX￿ St. Error￿
Undergraduate Degree in CSP￿ ￿ ￿ -0.5823￿ .0132**￿
Years of Service ￿ 0.0235￿ 0.0249￿ 0.1342￿ 0.1477￿
Years of Service - Squared￿ -0.0191￿ 0.0238￿ -0.2716￿ 0.1419￿
Female￿ 0.0035￿ 0.0033￿ 0.0087￿ 0.0210￿
Age￿ 0.0002￿ 0.0012￿ -0.0478￿ .0062**￿
Age-squared￿ 0.0000￿ 0.0000￿ 0.0005￿ .0000**￿
Black￿ 0.03239￿ .0157*￿ 0.01678￿ 0.0443￿
Hispanic￿ 0.0086￿ 0.0080￿ -0.0660￿ 0.0371￿
Asian￿ 0.0021￿ 0.0045￿ -0.0971￿ .0243**￿
Non-Supervisor (Not Exempt)￿ 0.0190￿ .0061**￿ -0.0596￿ .0231**￿
Weekly Wage (in thousands), $2001￿ 0.0024￿ 0.0036￿ -0.0440￿ .0149**￿
Participation in CSP by Peers (%)￿ 0.0029￿ 0.0016￿  ￿  ￿
Correlation Between Errors￿ 0.8128**￿ 0.1540￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Log-Likelihood￿ -2002.9￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Observations￿ 2788￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
* significant at 5% level  ** significant at 1% level￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  36 
 
Table 14: Probability of Pursuing an Graduate Degree in CSP and  
Separating from Employer before 5 years￿
Bivariate Probit Model￿ Pr(Grad=1)￿ Pr(S=1)￿
Hired Before Sept., 1999￿ dF/dX￿ St. Error￿ dF/dX￿ St. Error￿
Graduate Degree in CSP￿ ￿ ￿ 0.2198￿ 0.1951￿
Years of Service￿ 0.0009￿ 0.0007￿ -0.0339￿ .0026**￿
Years of Service - Squared￿ 0.0000￿ 0.0000￿ 0.0008￿ .0001**￿
Female￿ 0.0048￿ 0.0033￿ 0.0046￿ 0.0152￿
Age￿ -0.0004￿ 0.0012￿ -0.0588￿ .0046**￿
Age-squared￿ 0.0000￿ 0.0000￿ 0.0006￿ 0.0001**￿
Black￿ 0.0116￿ 0.0084￿ 0.0237￿ 0.0305￿
Hispanic￿ -0.0011￿ 0.0052￿ -0.0560￿ .0258*￿
Asian￿ -0.0108￿ .0032**￿ -0.0790￿ .0180**￿
Non-Supervisor (Not Exempt)￿ -0.0097￿ .0034**￿ -0.0197￿ 0.0164￿
Weekly Wage (in thousands), $2001￿ -0.0106￿ .0044*￿ 0.0219￿ .0102*￿
Participation in CSP by Peers (%)￿ 0.0065￿ .0014**￿  ￿  ￿
Correlation Between Errors￿ -0.4449￿ 0.2120￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Log-Likelihood￿ -4200.2￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Observations￿ 5826￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
* significant at 5% level  ** significant at 1% level￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
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Table 15: Probability of Pursuing an Graduate Degree in CSP and  
Separating from Employer before 5 years￿
Bivariate Probit Model￿ Pr(Grad=1)￿ Pr(S=1)￿
Hired After Sept., 1999￿ dF/dX￿ St. Error￿ dF/dX￿ St. Error￿
Graduate Degree in CSP￿ ￿ ￿ -0.5024￿ .1087**￿
Years of Service￿ 0.0402￿ 0.0501￿ 0.1345￿ 0.1476￿
Years of Service - Squared￿ -0.0101￿ 0.0068￿ -0.2589￿ 0.1422￿
Female￿ -0.0050￿ 0.0068￿ 0.0043￿ 0.0210￿
Age￿ 0.0003￿ 0.0024￿ -0.0493￿ .0062**￿
Age-squared￿ 0.0000￿ 0.0000￿ 0.0005￿ .0001**￿
Black￿ -0.0152￿ 0.0094￿ -0.0363￿ 0.0455￿
Hispanic￿ -0.0161￿ 0.0078￿ -0.0888￿ .0375*￿
Asian￿ 0.0040￿ 0.0077￿ -0.0982￿ .0246**￿
Non-Supervisor (Not Exempt)￿ 0.0065￿ 0.0072￿ -0.0734￿ .0232**￿
Weekly Wage (in thousands), $2001￿ 0.0085￿ .0043*￿ -0.0437￿ .0150**￿
Participation in CSP by Peers (%)￿ 0.0111￿ .0027**￿  ￿  ￿
Correlation Between Errors￿ 0.4913￿ 0.2926￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Log-Likelihood￿ -2194.4￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Observations￿ 2788￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
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